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Axel Hägerström, Uppsala School,  
and the Rise of Swedish Analytical Philosophy 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
While in Norway or Finland the analytical tradition is usually regarded as having its 
roots in Vienna,1 in Sweden it is generally associated with the choice of Axel Häger-
ström (1868–1939) for a professor of practical philosophy at the University of Uppsala. 
It was Hägerström who broke with Boström’s idealism, which dominated Swedish phi-
losophy since the mid-19th century, replacing it with a new school called Uppsalafilo-
sofin, and adopting conceptual analysis as the central method of modern philosophy. 
Teaching from 1893 until his retirement in 1933, Hägerström attacked the philosophi-
cal idealism of the followers of Christopher Jacob Boström (1797–1866), going down in 
history as the founder of (quasi-)positivist school of philosophy in Uppsala – the Swe-
dish equivalent of Anglo-American analytical philosophy and logical positivism of the 
Vienna Circle. Under the influence of neo-Kantianism, he called for the final rejection of 
metaphysics, assuming the motto: “Praeterea censeo metaphysicam esse delendam” 
(eng. “I also think that metaphysics should be destroyed.”) The aim of this paper is to 
present the philosophical figure of Axel Hägerström and the Uppsala School created by 
him. Then, analyzing the assumptions and fundamental postulates, we will discuss 
their impact on the development and shape of analytical thought in modern Sweden. 
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1 See: S. Nygård, J. Strang, Mellan idealism och analytisk filosofi. Den moderna filosofin 
i Finland och Sverige 1880–1950, Stockholm 2006. 
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Introduction 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the split within the philosophy 
of the Western world became an undeniable fact. In Great Britain, George 
Edward Moore assumed the first attack on idealism, publishing The Refuta-
tion of Idealism in 1903. As a result of breaking with the British idealism, 
strongly influenced by the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel (“There is no and can-
not be any reality,”) the Anglo-Saxon world was slowly taken over by the 
analytical tradition, and trends such as existentialism, phenomenology or 
hermeneutics were polarized and cumulatively united under the common 
name of continental philosophy. At the same time, initiated by scholars cen-
tered around Moritz Schlick at the University of Vienna, there emerged a new 
movement stemming from the positivist trend introduced by August Comte 
in the 19th century. The group bearing the name of the Vienna Circle subjected 
the entire idealistic philosophy to radical criticism, classifying it as meta-
physics and depriving it of the “truth-bearing” status of science. Even Swe-
den has finally succumbed to the crude charm of Anglo-American analytical 
philosophy and the ideas of logical positivism. Many researchers emphasize 
the presence of native roots in the analytical tradition2, most often in the per-
son of the philosopher Axel Hägerström (1868–1939), who, thanks to his cha-
risma and intellectual dynamics, managed to influence whole generations of 
Swedish intellectuals. A Swedish poet and writer studying in Uppsala, Karin 
Boye, will later write that “even his appearance inspired curiosity; he looked 
just like a philosopher should. Moreover he seemed to be present in a strange 
way, not only in the discussions in the student rooms, but in the very air.”3 
But the history of Hägerström and his legacy is not devoid of problematic 
moments. Terms such as “analytical” and “positivistic”, classifying his phi-
losophy in the eyes of the next generation, may today seem anachronistic and 
somewhat misleading. Philosophers are not living in an “academic vacuum” 
– the roots and history of analytical philosophy in Sweden are closely related 
to the movement which shifted the cultural center of the Western world from 
Germany towards Great Britain and the United States. While Hägerström 
lived and created within the German intellectual tradition inherited after 
Boström (1797–1866), his legacy was managed by philosophers whose plans 
                                                 
2 Zob. G. Frost-Arnold, “The Rise of ‚Analytic Philosophy’: When and How Did People 
Begin Calling Themselves ‘Analytical Philosophers’?”, [in:] Innovations in the History of 
Analytical Philosophy, eds. S. Lapointe, Ch. Pincock, Palgrave Macmillan 2017; P. Mindus, 
A Real Mind: The Life and Work of Axel Hägerström, Springer 2009; S. Nordin, Från Häger-
ström till Hedenius. Den moderna svenska filosofin, Lund 1983. 
3 P. Mindus, A Real Mind: The Life and Work of Axel Hägerström, Springer 2009, p. 2. 
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and ambitions guided them towards the Anglo-Saxon world. The purpose of 
this paper, however, is not to disprove Hägerström’s position as the founder 
of the analytical tradition in Sweden, but rather to investigate how did he gain 
such reputation. 
 
1. An outline of Axel Hägerström’s philosophy 
 
While in Norway or Finland the analytical tradition is usually regarded as 
having its roots in Vienna and logical positivism, in Sweden it is generally 
associated with the choice of Axel Hägerström (1868–1939) for a professor 
of practical philosophy at the University of Uppsala. It was Hägerström who 
broke with Boström's idealism, which dominated Swedish philosophy since 
the mid-19th century, replacing it with a new school called Uppsalafilosofin, 
and adopting conceptual analysis as its central method. Teaching from 1893 
until his retirement in 1933, Hägerström attacked the philosophical idealism 
of Christopher Jacob Boström’s followers, going down in history as the founder 
of (quasi-)positivist philosophical school in Uppsala. In recent years, the 
interest in his heritage has radically increased as a result of unearthing new 
– forgotten or suppressed – aspects of his philosophical development and 
influence. He broke with Boströmianism but the philosophy he defended had 
little to do with the post-war analytical philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon spirit 
that we know today. As in the case of Finland and Eino Kaila (1890–1958), 
it was only the generation after Hägerström, and people like Ingemar Hedenius 
and Ernst Cassirer, that created his image as the founder of the national 
analytical tradition. 
Johan Strang, researcher of the history and heritage of the Uppsala School, 
notes that Hägerström was extremely autonomous when it came to shaping 
his philosophical path. “It seems,” he wrote, “as if [Hägerström] consciously 
sought the reputation of a self-educated prophet.”4 In 1929 he presented     
a study of his intellectual development in the German series Die Philosophie 
der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen (eng. The philosophy of the present in 
self-portrayals), claiming that “he has never been particularly influenced by 
contemporary philosophy, due to […] its lack of criticism at its very founda-
tions.”5 However, he managed to find inspiration among historical philoso-
phers. Immanuel Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason opened a “new world” 
before him on first acquaintance with the work in 1887, but this “new world,” 
symbolizing the final break with Swedish idealism and the transcendental 
                                                 
4 S. Nygård, J. Strang, op. cit., p. 257 [Author’s translation]. 
5 Ibidem, p. 258 [Author’s translation]. 
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philosophical tradition inherited after Boström, was presented by Hägerström 
not before 1908, in Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft (eng. The principle of sci-
ence). Hägerström's mission was to return to Kant and discover the sources 
of error for all subsequent transcendental philosophy. 
Although Kant (1724–1804) succeeded to restore objective reality, he 
was unable to establish its epistemological accessibility in anything but the 
transcendental consciousness of a thinking and perceiving Self. This way, 
accepting the primacy of all-encompassing consciousness, he ultimately led 
to the disintegration of his own metaphysical system into the form of Ger-
man philosophical idealism. In the 20th century, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel (1770–1831) and his supporters managed to overcome the limita-
tions of kantianism, combining external (objective) reality with the produc-
tive activity of self-awareness, shifting the focus from the transcendental to 
the idealistic and metaphysical concept of the Self. Hägerström, however, 
was neither a continuator nor a commentator of the already existing ideas. 
He was an original thinker: he took up the problem of consciousness where 
Kant left it (after Descartes’ dualistic division into res cogitans and res extensa, 
with his eyes on overcoming Hume’s subjectivism and skeptical empiri-
cism), seeking a solution in a monistic, realistic concept of reality. 
Similarly to the positivists, the greatest affliction was for Hägerström the 
synthetic, transcendental metaphysics. The epigraph he chose to head his 
contribution to Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen was un-
compromising: “Praeterea censeo metaphysicam esse delendam.”6 Häger-
ström understood by metaphysics the idea of the absolute, “as truth in itself 
and the basis of all relative reality.” His criticism of metaphysics was closely 
related to the criticism of subjectivism, the belief that there exists “a con-
sciousness, directly accessible and thus constituting the ultimate basis of 
knowledge, as assumed by Descartes, Hume and Kant.”7 In Hägerström’s eyes, 
both idealism and realism (with which he associated empiricism) fell under 
the weight of subjectivism: the idealist wrongly assumes that knowledge is 
rooted in the mind of a cognitively active subject and not in material reality; 
the realist, on the other hand, assumes the difference between the subject’s 
subjective perception and the object itself. Hägerström’s solution was to 
abandon the view of perception and cognition as creating a certain image of 
the world. He claimed that our cognition and perception is always of some-
                                                 
6 “Besides, I think that metaphysics should be destroyed” is an analogy to Kato Elder and 
his “Besides, I think that Carthage should be destroyed”. 
7 A. Hägerström, “Framställning av den egna filosofin”, [in:] Filosofi och vetenskap, Stock-
holm 1957, pp. 111, 120 [Author’s translation]. 
AXEL HÄGERSTRÖM, UPPSALA SCHOOL...  125 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
thing as real as the elements of space-time itself, thus overcoming Kant’s 
transcendentalism. 
The realistic philosophy of the early 20th century played a precursory role 
in the emergence of logical empiricism. Hägerström’s realism did not have  
a direct impact on shaping the doctrine, but one could say some of the epis-
temological theses developed in Uppsala strictly correspond to the ideas 
that immediately precede the positivistic philosophy of Vienna and Berlin. 
Other theses coined and developed in Uppsala in the field of, for example, 
metaethics, turned out to be the nucleus of what will later be a crucial part of 
Anglo-Saxon analytical thought (represented by, among others, Georg Ed-
ward Moore). 
Of great importance was also Hägerström’s – later referred to as nihilis-
tic – theory of morality, which played a crucial role in shaping the cultural 
and social debate in Sweden, as well as laid the foundation for Scandinavian 
legal realism.8 In his speech inaugurating the academic year in 1911, Om 
moraliska föreställningars sanning (eng. On the Truth of Moral Ideas), Häger-
ström presented the idea that moral sentences / judgments do not possess 
a logical value (they cannot be true nor false), because they do not contain 
any information or extend our knowledge. Therefore, they can only be un-
derstood as mere expressions of feelings or emotions; they are simply men-
tal episodes with certain causal preconditions.9 Hägerström criticized not 
only ethical objectivism (assuming the existence of objective truth of moral 
judgments), but also ethical relativism (subjectivism), which at that time 
was strongly associated with the views of Finnish philosopher Edvard We-
stermarck and his work from 1906, The Origin and Development of Moral 
Ideas. According to Hägerström, the Westermarck’s error originated from 
blurring of the difference between moral value and moral valuation. Accord-
ing to  Hägerström, even if all intelligent beings have agreed on the valuation 
of a certain sentence about morality, it would not tell us anything about their 
objectivity or about the existence of somehow related moral values.10 
Hägerström’s supposed axiological nihilism was widely discussed in the 
cultural circles of interwar Sweden. Many feared that nihilism in the sphere of 
values could weaken the morale in the society. These fears were additionally 
fueled by Hägerström’s well-known social-democratic sympathies – in his 
works he used to refer to Marx quite positively, even though he always kept 
                                                 
8 J. Oniszczuk, Filozofia i teoria prawa, C.H. Beck 2008; K. Eliasz, Realistyczna koncepcja 
prawa Alfa Rossa, Wolters Kluwer 2016. 
9 E. Cassirer, Axel Hägerström: Eine Studie zur Schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart, 
Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift 45, Göteborg 1939. 
10 S. Nygård, J. Strang, op. cit., pp. 258–260. 
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a healthy distance, criticizing the theological and metaphysical elements of 
his theory. Hägerström and his nihilistic value theory was later associated 
with a progressive political movement, often provoking very violent reac-
tions from conservative circles. 
 
2. The Game of the Uppsala Throne 
 
In many respects, Hägerström and his school played a similar role in Sweden 
as the Vienna Circle played in Austria. The burning need of a philosophical 
equivalent for the modernist, cleansed from the avant-garde, intellectual 
movement, finally caused the philosophers to begin to exchange views with 
like-minded lawyers, economists and politicians. Also in the matter of their 
philosophical manifestos, both trends had much in common. They both criti-
cized the objectivist theories of values and preached the superiority of philo-
sophical conceptual analysis, which made up the “scientific” and “anti-meta-
physical” part of their research practice. Both the adepts of the Uppsala School 
and the thinkers associated in the Vienna Circle were convinced that they 
were perpetrators and witnesses of the contemporary intellectual revolu-
tion. 
However, these similarities turned out to be rather general and superfi-
cial in nature. Numerous hot spots in which the assumptions of both trends 
clashed with each other, were uncovered especially during debate between 
two philosophers of Uppsala (Gunnar Oxenstierna, Einar Tegen) and a logi-
cal empiricist, Philipp Frank. This lively discussion, exposed on the pages of 
the Swedish magazine Theoria in the late 1930s, was thoroughly reconstructed 
by Strang in his essays: Theoria and Logical Empiricism On the tensions be-
tween the National and the International in Philosophy and Positivism in the 
Northern Peripheries. Among the Uppsalists’ arguments he sharply distin-
guished the plea against subjectivism of methods used by the members of 
the Vienna Circle – in this respect, logical empiricism seemed to them no dif-
ferent from other, more classical, views of empiricism. On the other hand, 
according to Frank speaking on behalf of the Viennese, the strict formal and 
logical method used in conceptual analysis by the Uppsala philosophers 
seemed to be – due to the extreme nominalism inscribed in it – an idea too far 
from reality. Frank postulated that conceptual analysis should carry “true 
meaning” and reveal the proper sense of expressions.11 Differences of opinions 
                                                 
11 J. Strang, “Positivism in the Northern Peripheries: Generations of Positivist Philo-
sophers in Sweden and Its Neighboring Countries”, [in:] The Worlds of Positivism: A Global 
Intellectual History 1770–1930, eds. J. Feichtinger, F. L. Fillafer, J. Surman, Cham 2018, 
pp. 295–320.  
AXEL HÄGERSTRÖM, UPPSALA SCHOOL...  127 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
between schools could also be spotted in their attitude towards modern 
natural sciences. While logical empiricists wanted to modify the philosophi-
cal assumptions based on the latest achievements of empirical sciences, Hä-
gerström and Uppsalians sought the necessary corrections within the natu-
ral sciences, starting from their own philosophical assumptions (criticizing 
therefore the emerging theory of relativity.)12 Finally, the differences be-
tween the Vienna Circle and the Uppsala School concerned also their atti-
tude to other philosophical trends, and thus – to each other. While Hägerström 
and his students seemed not to be too interested in making any international 
connections, the Vienna Circle functioned as a platform for understanding 
and exchanging views of scientists and thinkers of many nationalities and 
professions. Interestingly, the Vienna Circle itself treated the Uppsala School 
as an allied group.13 
In the end, Uppsala School and logical positivism were – at least in the 
years of their prosperity – two different currents of thought. The vision of 
the Uppsala School as closely related to the positivist view was shaped only 
during the war period, when a large group of students, including Gunnar 
Oxenstierna, Einar Tegen, Ingemar Hedenius, Konrad Marc-Wogau and An-
ders Wedberg, began to promote, next to Hägerström, professor Adolph Pha-
lén (1884–1931), whose activity has so far been suppressed by the “ortho-
dox hägerströmists.” According to the author of the book A Real Mind: The 
Life and Work of Axel Hägerström, Patricia Mindus, the conflict concerned, 
above all, the origins of particular aspects of the Uppsala School’s philoso-
phy, such as the use of conceptual analysis or criticism of subjectivism. The 
atmosphere around the academic circle deteriorated with each passing year 
and eventually evolved into a battle for the Uppsala School’s heritage – a bat-
tle that Phalén’s supporters managed to “win,” finally marrying the Uppsala 
tradition with the international trend of analytical philosophy and its logico-  
-empirical roots. 
 
                                                 
12 J. Strang, “Theoria and Logical Empiricism On the tensions between the National and 
the International in Philosophy”, [in:] The Vienna Circle in the Nordic Countries: Networks and 
Transformations of Logical Empiricis, eds. J. Manninen, F. Stadler, Vienna 2010, pp. 69–89. 
13 The best-known example of a thinker who was regarded by the Vienna Circle as an 
ally, recognizing himself as their greatest critic and adversary, was Karl Popper. In regard 
to Scandinavia, one can point out in this context the person of Arne Næss, who was very 
surprised by the reaction to his published text Wie fördert man heute die empirische Be-
wegung. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Otto Neurath und Rudolph Carnap. The article was 
thought to be a direct attack on the fundamental theses of the Vienna Circle but Otto Neurath 
accepted it very warmly as a suggestion for improvements to the positivist program. 
128  AGNIESZKA MARIA PROSZEWSKA 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3. Uppsala School and the analytical tradition – the final union 
 
Józef Maria Bocheński, a representative of the Kraków branch of the analyti-
cal school, distinguished four elements defining this way of practicing phi-
losophy: analysis, language, logic and subject. The basis of the analysis was 
to reject the “global” synthesis – the tendency to create complex, comprehen-
sive metaphysical systems. “For us, analysts, philosophers who fabricate great, 
all-encompassing syntheses are superstitious philosophers, they want to do 
things that are impossible to do […]. A normal analytical philosopher con-
siders modern times, from Descartes to the mid-19th century, as dark centu-
ries, in which philosophers instead of conducting analyzes mostly fabricated 
worldviews […],”14 writes the representative of the Krakow Circle. The main 
field of the philosopher’s work became language and conceptual analysis, 
which constituted, as Bocheński used to say, “the basic condition of every de-
cent philosophical work”15 – there is no other access to concepts than through 
words. In the reconstruction and analysis of philosophical problems, logical 
tools were to be helpful. Their value was strongly emphasized, among others, 
by Jerzy Perzanowski. “If the philosophical concept is actually deep, then 
after accurate formalization we see it clearly and fully. Formalization does 
not harm the deepness but the turbidity,”16 says Perzanowski in answer to 
the question “How to philosophize?” The analytical philosophy had to be, simi-
larly to science, intersubjectively-oriented, criticizing the search for confir-
mation of its theses in the internal states of the subject (eg. feelings, intui-
tion). “Analysts reject all subjectivisms and, at the same time, all gibberish. 
Gibberish is the perfect tool to express feelings, but not to communicate objec-
tive reality,”17 writes Bocheński in his essay Analytical Philosophy. 
The first step towards the unification of these still separate currents of 
thought was made in 1937, on the pages of the volume Adolf Phalén in memo-
riam. Philosophical Essays, edited by Hedenius and Marc-Wogau in memory 
of their master. According to the researchers of the Uppsala School’s tradi-
tion,18 the memorial volume did not achieve the desired goal. Despite at-
tempts to present Phalén as a central figure in the Uppsala School, in the eyes 
of the public Hägerström was still an undisputed leader and founder of the 
                                                 
14 J. M. Bocheński, “Filozofia analityczna”, [in:] idem, Sens życia i inne eseje, Kraków 1993, 
p. 139 [Author’s translation]. 
15 Ibidem, pp. 140–141 [Author’s translation]. 
16 J. Perzanowski, Jak filozofować?, Warszawa 1989, p. 7 [Author’s transaltion]. 
17 J. M. Bocheński, op. cit., p. 145 [Author’s translation]. 
18 See: P. Mindus, A Real Mind: The Life and Work of Axel Hägerström; S. Nordin, Från 
Hägerström till Hedenius. Den moderna svenska filosofin; S. Nygård, J. Strang, op. cit.  
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movement. In those circumstances, Hedenius' 1941 dissertation Om rätt och 
moral (eng. About truth and morals) turned out to be a brilliant strategic move. 
Defending Hägerström’s widely discussed nihilistic theory of morality, He-
denius followed in the footsteps of the great Uppsala tradition… Yet, while 
Hägerström’s “nihilistic” roots were to be found in Brentano and Meinong’s 
“psychology of values” and the analysis of psychological, epistemological and 
ontological status of moral judgments, in Hedenius’ approach the issue has 
been shifted to the philosophy (semantics) of language in Carnap and Ayer’s 
spirit.19 He claimed that even if the statements about values can be neither 
true nor false, they can be translated into emotive expressions such as “oh” 
or “hurray.” According to various researchers (i.a. Nordin, Strang), it was He-
denius who first introduced analytical philosophy to Sweden, anchoring it 
in national philosophy. He worked through the legacy left by Hägerström, pre-
senting the Uppsala School as parallel to the Vienna Circle or the Cambridge 
School – as an expression of the general trend of building philosophical alli-
ances. 
When at the end of the 1940s Hedenius and Marc-Wogau received pro-
motions for professorial positions in Uppsala, the struggle against the or-
thodox hägerströmism was over, and the transition from the “old” to “new” 
Uppsala School in the analytical, Anglo-Saxon spirit became a fact. It should 
not go unnoticed that they received a huge support from their logico-empirical 
colleagues from border countries, such as Kaila in Finland, who openly put 
forward Hedenius and Marc-Wogau over Hägerström’s supporter Martin 
Fries, saying that they are representatives of the kind of Uppsala philosophy 
that “with good winds will soon become a part of a more developed logico-  
-empirical platform.”20 The newly elected professors did not fail to mention 
the importance of the relationship with logical empiricism in their inaugu-
ral speeches. Both of them clearly indicated that their mission is to maintain 
the continuity of Uppsala thought, not to break with it. Marc-Wogau concluded 
his speech Uppsalafilosofin och den logiska empirismen (eng. Uppsala School 
and the logical empirism) with a thought that both schools created a “com-
mon front against a whole host of different currents in modern philosophy.”21 
The previous differences in attitudes towards the role of natural sciences 
and the use of formal logic, which until now have been points of contention 
between the old Uppsala School and logical empiricism, were to be blurred. 
                                                 
19 S. Nygård, J. Strang, op. cit., pp. 260–261 [Author’s translation]. 
20 Ibidem, p. 262 [Author’s translation]. 
21 K. Marc-Wogau, Uppsalafilosofin och den logiska empirismen, Studier till Axel Häger-
ströms filosofi, Stockholm 1968, p. 49 [Author’s translation]. 
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Hedenius’ speech only reinforced this vision, calling logic “the backbone of 
philosophy and its most promising tool.”22 
Hedenius and Marc-Wogau managed to create and maintain the image of 
Hägerström and the Uppsala School that was widely accepted for a long time. 
It was only after their deaths when Swedish historians and philosophers 
took up the mission of re-interpreting Hägerström’s image as the father of 
Swedish analytical thought. Jan Bengtsson emphasized the importance of 
Hägerström’s and Phalén’s inspiration in phenomenology, while Hans Ruin 
referred to Nietzsche’s significance for Hägerström’s nihilistic theory of values. 
The one-sided image of Uppsala philosophy as a movement parallel to the 
Vienna Circle or the Cambridge School gave way to a more complex picture, 
according to which Hägerström and the Uppsala School acted in a much more 
complicated philosophical context than the next generation wanted to see. 
However, this story is not unique in this respect. In fact, there are many simi-
larities between the changes that the Uppsala philosophy underwent under 
the supervision of Hedenius and Marc-Wogau, and the development of logi-
cal positivism itself in connection to the migration to the Anglo-Saxon world. 
Like the philosophers of Uppsala, logical positivists have found many inspi-
rations both in neo-Kantianism and in the phenomenological movement. The 
analytical philosophy itself, despite the fact that it was established around 
World War II, has sowed its seeds in philosophical minds long before then. 
In this context, Hägerström and the Uppsala School played the same role in 
Sweden as Kaila and logical positivism in Finland, and the Vienna Circle, the 
Cambridge School and pragmatism in the Anglo-Saxon world. 
 
Final remarks 
 
In many ways, the Vienna Circle and the Uppsala School were closely related. 
One can notice, however, that the Uppsals surpassed the Viennese in creat-
ing an intellectual movement that affected not only various fields of science 
(eg law, social sciences) but also cultural life and political debate. Häger-
ström is often considered as a representative of the intellectual “rebirth” in 
Sweden and a philosophical revolutionary. Although he himself probably 
would not feel comfortable with terms such as “analytical” or “positivistic”, 
this is precisely the image of Hägerström as the founder of the national ana-
lytic tradition that was coined by his successors. One might be tempted to 
say that Hedenius and Marc-Wogau created a legend that suited their own 
vision of the school. 
                                                 
22 I. Hedenius, “Om praktisk filosofi”, [in:] Om människans moraliska villkor, Stockholm 
1972, p. 19 [Author’s translation]. 
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It is important to distinguish between those who create, describe and act 
within the analytical movement, from those who, as a result of these activi-
ties, were recognized as the tradition’s historic fathers. Hägerström’s history 
shows above all that philosophical tradition can be created in many ways, 
but also emphasizes the importance of chance in the history of philosophy. 
“It is not inconceivable that the history of […] Hägerström’s life and work 
would differ from the history of the emergence of the analytic tradition in 
Sweden”, writes Strang... 
“If only someone else wrote it”23, he adds. 
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